|News and opinions on situation in Venezuela|
|2/9/04||Venezuela's President Chavez Frias and the referendum: myths and realities by James Petras|
Binghamton University (New York) Sociology Professor James Petras writes: Between rightwing frustration and leftwing euphoria, little has been written about the complex and contradictory reality of Venezuela politics and the specificities of President Chavez policies. Even less discussion has focused on the division between ideological Washington and pragmatic Wall Street, between the politics of confrontation and conciliation, and the convergences and divergences between Venezuela and the rest of Latin America. Both the right and left have substituted myths about the Chavez government rather than confronting realities.
Myth 1 — Chavez is an unpopular President who the rightwing opposition is capable of defeating in the referendum.
Reality — The rightwing and its backers in Washington miscalculated on several counts. First the weakest moment of the Chavez government was right after the PDVSA executive lock-out (December 2002 ˆ February 2003), when oil prices were much lower, the economy was devastated, the social welfare programs of the government were under funded and grass roots political organizations were weak.
By the time the referendum took place (August 2004), one and a half years later, socio-economic and political conditions had dramatically changed.
The economy was growing by 12%, oil prices were at record highs, social welfare expenditures were increasing and their social impact was highly visible and widespread, and the mass social organizations were deeply embedded in populous neighborhoods throughout the country.
Clearly the initiative had passed from the right to the left, but both the US and its opposition collaborators were blind to the realities.
Having lost control over the state petroleum industry and allocation of funds via the failed lockout in early 2003, having lost influence in the military after the failed coup of April 2002, the opposition possessed few resources to limit the government‚s referendum campaign and no leverage in launching a post election Œcivic-military‚ coup.
Myth 2 — According to the rightwing analysts the referendum was based on the issue of Chavez Œpopularity‚, Œpersonality‚, charisma and Œautocratic‚ style.
In reality the referendum was based on class/race divisions. Non-opposition trade union leaders indicated that over 85% of the working class and working poor voted for Chavez, while preliminary reports on voting in affluent neighborhoods and circumscriptions showed just the reverse over 80% voting for the referendum.
A similar process or class/race polarization was evident in the extraordinary turnout and vote among poor Afro-Venezuelans: The higher the turnout, the higher the vote for Chavez, as an unprecedented 71% of the electorate voted. Clearly Chavez was successful in linking social welfare programs, class allegiances to electoral behavior.
Myth 3 — Among both the Right and Left there is a belief that the mass media control mass voting behavior, limit political agendas and necessarily lead to the victory of the Right and the domestication of the Left.
In Venezuela the Right controlled 90% of the major television networks and print media and most of the major radio stations. Yet the referendum was crushed by an 18% margin (59% to 41%).
The results of the referendum demonstrates that powerful grass roots organizations built around successful struggles for social reforms can create a mass political and social consciousness which can easily reject media manipulation.
Elite optimism in their Œstructural power‚ — money, media monopoly, and backing by Washington — blinded them to the fact that conscious collective organization can be a formidable counterweight to elite resources.
Likewise referendum results refute the argument put forth by the center-left that they lose elections because of the mass media. The center-left justify embracing neo-liberalism to “neutralize‰ the mass media during elections.
They refuse to recognize that elections can be won despite mass media opposition if previous mass struggle and organization created mass social consciousness.
Myth 4 — According to many leftist journalists, Chavez victory reflected a new wave of popular nationalist politics in Latin America. Evidence to the contrary is abundant.
Brazil under Lula has sold oil exploration rights to US and European multinational corporations, provides a contingent of 1500 troops (along with Argentina, Chile etc) to Haiti to stabilize Washington‚s puppet regime imposed through the kidnapping of President-elect Aristide.
Likewise in the other Andean countries (Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Colombia) the elected regimes propose to privatize public petroleum companies, support ALCA and Plan Colombia and pay their foreign debts.
The Broad Front in Uruguay promises to follow Brazil‚s neo-liberal policies. While Chavez promotes the regional trading bloc MERCOSUR, the major members Brazil and Argentina are increasing their trade relations outside the region.
In effect there is a bloc of neo-liberal regimes arrayed against Chavez‚s anti-imperialist policies and mass social movements. To the extent that Chavez continues his independent foreign policy his principle allies are the mass social movements and Cuba.
Myth 5 — The defeat of the referendum was a major tactical defeat of US imperialism and its local vassals. But a defeat of imperialism does not necessarily mean or lead to a revolutionary transformation, as post-Chavez post-election appeals to Washington and big business demonstrate.
More indicative of Chavez politics is the forthcoming $5 billion dollar investment agreements with Texaco-Mobil and Exxon to exploit the Orinoco gas and oil fields. The euphoria of the left prevents them from observing the pendulum shifts in Chavez discourse and the heterodox social welfare — neo-liberal economic politics he has consistently practiced.
President Chavez‚ policy has always followed a careful balancing act between rejecting vassalage to the US and local oligarchic rentiers on the one hand and trying to harness a coalition of foreign and national investors, urban and rural poor to a program of welfare capitalism. He is closer to Franklin Roosevelt‚s New Deal than Castro‚s socialist revolution. In the aftermath of the three political crises — the failed civil-military coup, the debacle of the oil executives lock out, and the defeat of the referendum — Chavez offered to dialogue and reach a consensus with the media barons, big business plutocrats and US government, on the basis of the existing property relations, media ownership and expanded relations with Washington.
Chavez‚ commitment to centrist-reformist policies explains why he did not prosecute owners of the mass media who had openly called for the violent overthrow of his government and also why he took no judicial action against the association of the business leaders (Fedecamaras) who has incited military rebellion and violent attacks on the constitutional order.
In Europe, North America and many other regions, democratically-elected governments would have arrested, and prosecuted these elites for acts of violent subversion.
President Chavez has constantly reiterated that their property, privileges and wealth is not in question. Moreover the fact that these elites have been able to engage in three unconstitutional efforts to overthrow the regime and still retain their class positions, strongly suggest that President Chavez still conceives of their playing an important role in his vision of development based on private-public partnership and social welfare spending.
After 5 years of government and after 3 major “class confrontations,‰ it is evident that at least at the level of the government, there has been no rupture in property or class relations and no break with foreign creditors, investors or oil clients. Within the fiscal framework of foreign debt payments, subsidies to private exporters, low-interest loans to industrialists, the government has increased the allocation of state spending for social programs in health, education housing, micro-enterprises and agrarian reform.
The Venezuelan government can maintain this balance between big business and the poor because of the high prices and revenue from petroleum exports.
Like President Roosevelt, Chavez‚s positive social welfare programs attract millions of low income voters, but do not affect money income levels, nor create large scale employment projects.
Unemployment is still in the vicinity of 20% and poverty levels still remain over 50%.
Comprehensive social spending has positively affected the social lives of the poor but has not improved their class position. Chavez is both confrontational and radical when his rulership is threatened and conciliatory and moderate when he successfully overcomes the challenge.
Myth 6 — The Left and Right have failed to recognize a divergence of tactics between an ideological Washington and a pragmatic Wall Street.
The US political class (both Republican and Democrats, the Presidency and Congress) have been actively threatening, intervening and supporting destructive lockouts, violent coups and a fraudulent referendum to oust Chavez.
In contrast the major US and European oil companies and banks have been engaged in stable, sustained and profitable economic relations with the Chavez government. Foreign creditors have received prompt and punctual payments of billions of dollars in payments and have not spoken or acted in a fashion to disrupt these lucrative transactions.
Major US multi-national oil companies project between US$5 billion and $20 billion in new investments in exploration and exploitation. No doubt these MNCs would have liked the coup to succeed in order to monopolize all Venezuelan oil revenue, but perceiving the failures of Washington they are content to share part of the oil wealth with the Chavez regime.
The tactical divergences between Washington and Wall Street are likely to narrow as the Venezuelan government moves into the new conciliatory phase toward Fedecamaras and Washington. Given Washington‚s defeat in the referendum, and the big oil deals with key US multinationals, it is likely that Washington will seek a temporary Œtruce‚ until new, more favorable circumstances emerge.
It will be interesting to see how this possible “truce‰ will affect Venezuela‚s critical foreign policy.
Myth 7 — The main thrust of the current phase of Chavez revolution is a moral crusade against government corruption and a highly politicized judicial system tightly aligned with the discredited political opposition. For many on the Left, the radical content of the ŒNo‚ vote campaign was rooted in the proliferation of community based mass organizations, the mobilization of trade union assemblies, and the decentralized democratic process of voter involvement based on promises of future consequential social changes in terms of jobs, income and popular political power.
Moralization campaigns (anti-corruption) are commonly associated with middle class politics designed to create “national unity‰ and usually weaken class solidarity.
The Left‚s belief that the mass organizations mobilized for the referendum will necessarily become a basis for a Œnew popular democracy‚ has little basis in the recent past (similar mobilizations took place prior to the failed coup and during the bosses‚ lockout). Nor do government-sponsored moralization campaigns attract much interest among the poor in Venezuela or elsewhere.
Moreover the focus of the Chavista political leaders is on the forthcoming elections for parliament, not in creating alternative sources of governance.
The Left‚s facile projection of popular mobilization into the post-referendum period creates a political mythology, which fails to recognize the internal contradictions of the political process in Venezuela.
The fact that the favorable voting outcome was recognized by the OAS, Carter and Washington is a tribute to President Chavez strategic changes in the military, guaranteeing the honoring of the constitutional outcome.
At a deeper level of analysis, the conceptions and perceptions of the major antagonists among the Right and the Left however are open to criticism: The Right for underestimating the political and institutional support for Chavez in the current conjuncture and the Left for projecting an overly radical vision on the direction of politics in the post-referendum period.
From a Œrealist‚ position, we can conclude that the Chavez government will proceed with his “New Deal‰ social welfare programs while deepening ties with major foreign and domestic investors … his ability to balance classes, leaning in one direction or the other will depend on the continued flow of high returns from oil revenues. If oil prices drop, hard choices will have to be made — class choices.