The New Dark Age

Monday, 16 June 2025 — Enemy Watch

Iran’s recent military actions, particularly drone and missile strikes against Zionist targets, are being closely watched by enemies and attacks over Iran too. Not just through satellites or spies, but through digital content. OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) accounts have become a primary weapon in this war. Their job is to track strikes over Iran in real time, evaluate the damage, and help coordinate re-attacks based on collected evidence. These accounts leak Iranian attack sites even before official sources confirm them, and this is not a coincidence.

After every major strike, these accounts begin collecting videos, photos, and eyewitness posts from platforms like Telegram, Instagram, and X. Using AI and mapping software, they determine if a strike hit its target, missed, or caused casualties. This allows the Zionists and their Western backers to issue fake narratives such as “no damage” or “missiles intercepted.” At the same time, they prepare re-attacks on the same area if they confirm that Iran’s strike was effective.

This is why, after many israeli attacks, the same location is targeted again within hours or days. Not because satellites picked it up. These OSINT accounts provided the coordinates. In many cases, these accounts publish clearer photos, maps, and data than Iranian official sources. So the critical question arises: how do they get this material before anyone else?

The answer is simple. These materials are being fed to them from inside Iran. Operatives under civilian cover, including false journalists or digital volunteers, are embedded in cities, border towns, military-adjacent zones, and even sensitive institutions. They act like citizens, but their work is for Mossad, CIA, or Gulf-backed intelligence arms. They gather digital evidence and send it to OSINT networks abroad.

Even the smallest clue is useful. A drone trail. The sound of a launch. The angle of a shadow. A timestamp on a skyline. With AI and machine learning, this data is enough to triangulate a location and confirm a strike’s accuracy. They use metadata extraction, terrain and skyline matching, satellite overlays, and audio-waveform analysis. These systems recreate full maps of strike zones. They are not random images. They are exact coordinates processed through advanced tools and then handed to military analysts abroad.

We saw the same thing in Syria. After Aleppo’s fall, OSINT networks helped HTS and foreign militias identify areas where Syrian and Iranian positions had been weakened. In Gaza, after a resistance strike, videos posted online were used to target the same site again. In Lebanon, even funerals of martyrs were attacked after processions were posted. During the massacre of Syrian Alawites on the coast by HTS, our own team located the site through video analysis to bring the issue on public. That tells you how simple it is once you understand the techniques.

These OSINT accounts are not static. They change their names depending on the region they are targeting. From Syria Watcher to Iran Mapping. From War Observer to Intel Sky. From supposed neutral observers to active tools of intelligence warfare. Their mission is constant: to expose operations, sabotage defense zones, help enemy targeting, and rewrite narratives. We have tracked over 120 posts that led to follow-up enemy attacks or psychological campaigns.

Let’s get into the tech. These accounts use the following tools:

• Satellite image matching through Google Earth and Sentinel
• AI-based terrain detection and skyline alignment
• Metadata extraction from photos and videos
• Real-time geolocation using sound patterns and light flash analysis
• Reverse video/image search combined with machine learning
• Social graph tracking to identify who shared what and from where

With enough input, they can map entire missile flight paths. They can identify launch points. They can assess if an air defense failed. This data is not just saved. It is weaponized.