The New Dark Age

The wheels of geopolitics keep turning, and the aims of the US policies have become very evident with respect to these three countries:

• Brazil: Reinstate US dominance and Brazilian vassalage in America’s “backyard”
• India: Undermine Russia by cutting off its oil sales, while forcing India to reduce its linkages with BRINKCISTAN (Belarus, Russia, Iran, North Korea, China, Iraq, and the “Stans”)
• Azerbaijan (and Armenia): With Georgia lost, use Azerbaijan (and Armenia) as a pivot point to cause trouble in the Caucasus and as a base for US forces to infiltrate Russia and Iran

Brazil

The US had a goods trade surplus with Brazil in 2024 of US$6.8 billion (up 23.9% from 2023) and a services trade surplus of US$23.1 billion (up 31.9% from 2023) with the country. It is very obvious that the sanctions have nothing to do with trade, and everything to do with direct interference in the internal affairs of Brazil (the demands wth respect to Bolsonaro). The US good exports are predominantly fossil fuels, chemicals (including fertilizers), plastics, leather goods and some manufactured goods (e.g. aircraft and machinery); all of which can be sourced from other nations. Main Brazilian exports to the US are refined and non-refined fossil fuels, semi-finished iron, aircraft, coffee and beef. Most of these exist within global fungible markets allowing Brazil to export to other nations than the US, and a China with a rapidly growing GDP per capita that as an increasing taste for coffee and beef.

The US has next to no leverage upon Brazil, and Trump’s actions have needlessly fed into a nationalist and anti-US fervour with his 50% import tariff. This has strengthened Lula’s position and his ability to deepen economic and financial linkages with other nations. Brazil’s biggest trading partner is China, with which it ran a trade surplus in 2024 of US$31 billion. China represented 28% of exports and 24% of imports, while the EU was 14%/18%, and the US 12%/15%. Brazil has a free trade agreement with the EU under Mercorsur. Although Brazil does not have a free trade agreement with China, the two nations signed memorandums of understanding and protocols to deepen the relationships between the two countries on July 10th. Chinese companies, especially in the automotive sector, are also setting up large production plants in Brazil.

India

The imposition of a 25% tariff on India, together with the threat of an additional 25% tariff within a few weeks if India does not stop buying Russian oil shows an utter misunderstanding of Indian internal political, and the geopolitical, realities. India is not the vassal EU, and is very proud of its independence and sovereignty. It would also be a very dangerous political thing for Modi to cave into such US pressure.

In 2024 Indian goods exports to the US totalled US$87.3 billion. With Indian GDP at US$4.19 trillion, that’s 2% of GDP. Top exports were mobile phones (Apple), and Drugs and Medical Accessories, while imports (US$41.5 billion) were mainly oil, coal, and electronic components. The overall Indian goods trade surplus with the US is equivalent to about 1% of GDP. Pharmaceuticals are exempted from the tariffs.

In 2024 Indian services exports to the US totalled US$41.6 billion and services imports totalled US$41.6 billion – balanced. The Indian exports were mostly IT-enabled, such as IT and call centres. US imports were mainly travel, finance, business services, communication services and software. Services are not covered by the tariffs, so India’s offshoring industry is not at risk.

The rational decision of India would be to replace the US goods imports (relatively easily done) and improve relations with China, including with respect to Chinese firms setting up shop in India to help manufacturing development. Also, India joining the RCEP free trade zone with South East Asia, China, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea would help orient India’s trade toward Eurasia. India needs to follow Brazil’s example and teach the Trump administration a lesson. Its rejection of the over-priced and low performing F35 was a good start, but it must do much more to display the strength that Trump respects.

Azerbaijan (and Armenia)

The New Azerbaijan Party, controlled by the countries oligarchy such as the dominant Aliyev family, has been in power since 1993. The nation is run by a corrupt oligarchy fed by its oil and gas wealth, with some fluidity within the oligarchy. The nation borders Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Iran so you would think that Azerbaijan would prioritize good relations with its neighbours; especially the much more powerful Russia and Iran. In the Caucasus, the West’s main play had been Georgia but that project of vassalization has now been destroyed so they have been looking for other troublemakers in the region.

Armenia, under the idiot traitor Pashinyan, has gone all in with the West even though it had been Russian peace keeping troops that had kept Azerbaijan at bay. He has already stated that Armenia will be withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) between Armenia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Relations with Turkey have been historically poisoned due to the Armenian genocide and Turkey’s refusal to acknowledge it, but Pashinyan is now pushing to normalize relations between the two countries. Turkey has strong relations with Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan came to power through a 2018 colour revolution, and has increasingly shown himself to be nothing more than a Western vassal; with France a source of military supplies. He has already lost the Nagorno-Karabakh region in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, is in direct conflict with the church authorities, has had disputes with the military, and has current poll ratings below 20%; the next parliamentary elections (Pashinyan is PM) will be held in June 2026. The current discussions about a US presence in the Zangezur Corridor that passes through Armenia to link the two parts of Azerbaijan are an obvious self-preservation play by Pashinyan to gain a US presence to back up his failing regime before the 2026 elections. For the US, it will provide not just influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan but also a base from which to infiltrate Iran. Such a move would also reduce the earnings that Iran currently enjoys by providing a linkage between the two parts of Azerbaijan. Of course, Iran and Russia would be extremely hostile to such a US presence.

Azerbaijan is playing with fire with its aggressive moves against Russia in response to the arrest of several dozen ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg in connection with a series of murders that took place fifteen years ago; with two brothers dying in custody. The Azeri diaspora within Russia has always provided security and criminal gang concerns, and it seems that Russia has decided that it was time to crack down on Azeri criminal networks. The Azeri authorities accused the Russians of deliberately killing the suspects (who were accused of killing other Azeris in Russia), cancelled cultural events, raided Sputnik and detained its employees who were beaten and accused of drug dealing and cyberfraud, implemented regular document checks for Russian nationals, and aired criticisms in the state media. This would seem to be a significant over-reaction and as Carnegie Politika notes, may be the result of larger Azeri machinations that used the situation as a pretence to increase conflict between the two nations:

Brutality and impunity among the security forces are hardly anything new on either side of the Russia–Azerbaijan border, but they have never previously led to such a crisis in relations. It would appear that the deaths in custody of two men—even ones accused of involvement in organized crime and the murder of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Russia fifteen years ago—are a convenient pretext for the Azerbaijani authorities to use a confrontation with Moscow to strengthen their position both at home and abroad.

Russia is bogged down in its war against Ukraine and isolated in the West by countless sanctions, which has made Azerbaijan an important logistics partner for Moscow. Since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has been actively investing in transport infrastructure on Azerbaijani territory and projects along the Russia-Iran-India route.

At the same time, Russia’s initiative and influence in the South Caucasus has drastically weakened. First, Russian peacekeepers deployed to the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh after the 2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani war put up no resistance to Azerbaijan’s blockade of the region. Nor, in September 2023, did they intervene in Baku’s successful military operation to take control of Nagorno-Karabakh. And in the spring of 2024, the Russian peacekeeping contingent left the region ahead of schedule.

So the Azeri oligarchy saw their chance to throw their weight around and renegotiate their relationship with Russia.

The standoff with Moscow is designed to show that Azerbaijan is not in fact an authoritarian ally of Russia, but a strategic partner of the West in the global confrontation with Russia, especially in the energy sector. Accordingly, it would be wiser for Brussels and Washington to turn a blind eye to the internal problems of a country that is so useful to them. Baku’s statements in support of Ukraine, and Aliyev’s recent phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky were aimed at shoring up this image.

They cannot afford to escalate things further, as the Azeri economy is so dependent upon trade with Russia.

By falling out with the Kremlin, Azerbaijan’s authorities are trying to score points both at home and internationally—but all within boundaries that allow Russia to remain a key economic partner. In this regard, Azerbaijani foreign policy bears a growing resemblance to that of Turkey: aggressive demarches followed by fresh rapprochements, conflicts without severing relations, and maneuvering between various blocs.

This is the same short-term stupidity displayed by Turkey, which thinks it can play games while Russia is engaged in the Ukrainian War with no consequences when Russia inevitably wins that war. Also, in moving toward a West that is in decline and will not subjugate an Iran that will only grow stronger. Instead of embracing Russia, China, Iran and Eurasia in general. Azerbaijan has been working on ways of reducing its reliance upon Russia, through such things as the Black Sea electricity cable that will carry electricity via Georgia to the EU and its recent export of natural gas through the Trans-Balkan gas corridor that links Turkey to the Balkans and Ukraine (via a hub in Orlivka, Ukraine). This hub, that also facilitates the supply of US gas to Ukraine, was attacked by Russia on August 6th. The supply of gas from Azerbaijan to a country that Russia is actively at war with is a significant escalation by Azerbaijan, and Russia’s attack on the Orlivka hub may be sending a message that the Azeris should listen to.

The Trump administration saw the opportunity and leapt in to act as a mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan (replacing Russia) and to push for US control of the Zengezur Corridor. Such an agreement would be extremely stupid for the Azeris to reach, as they can already link the two parts of the nation through Iran and know that this would greatly escalate tensions with its biggest trading partner and with its powerful neighbour to the south. Whether or not such an agreement is signed will be highly indicative of the Azeri elite’s understanding of medium term geopolitics and on the level of patience that Russia and Iran exercise. The Iranians have the additional concern of the at least 10 million Azeri diaspora (one in nine Iranians) in Iran that predominantly live in the areas bordering Azerbaijan; something that would serve the usual Western drive to break up adversaries into smaller ethnic pieces.

Once the Ukraine War ends, or even perhaps before then, there will be consequences for the Azeri oligarchy and for Pashinyan (who may quite possibly flee to the West to escape the consequences brought upon him by his own population if he loses next years elections). The extreme tactical and short-sighted moves of the US show a weakening power that is engaged in tactical responses rather than any strategic long-term plan. Tactics that are undermining its relations with other nations, and pushing many closer to BRINKCISTAN.