The New Dark Age

23 October, 2009 — Strategic Culture Foundation

Under pressure, Afghan President Hamid Karzai agreed that he failed to garner over 50% of the vote in the first round of the elections and accepted the run-off which is scheduled for November 7.

Afghanistan’s way to the elections was long and marked with heightened expectations. The population hoped for a breakthrough as it was getting increasingly obvious that Karzai’s administration was unable to rise to the challenges facing the country plagued by the lack of security, rampant crime, poor governance, widespread corruption, unemployment, miserable living standards, drug business, and the heavy dependence on foreign aid.

Among other factors, it bred hopes that the list of presidential candidates included well-known figures offering the society new ideas and developmental models. Though it is traditional in Afghanistan to vote for individual leaders rather than for their political programs, in fact by doing so the population expresses support for politicians who cannot only float ideas that meet with public approval but also put them into practice.

The above explains the popularity of Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Gani, the two candidates with appreciable administrative backgrounds. The former is an experienced economics reformer and the latter used to represent Afghanistan internationally. Another significant contender was Ramazan Bashardost – a self-described Afghan Ghandi – who earned popularity both as a bold critic of Karzai’s regime and as an individual with an ascetic lifestyle similar to that of the constituency. The three candidates – Abdullah, Gani, and Bashardost – had serious chances for success provided that the elections were fair.

However, there is evidence that massive fraud took place during the August 20 elections in Afghanistan. Most of the fraud charges are leveled at Karzai who was clearly eager to retain presidency at any cost. Long before the elections Karzai launched power-sharing negotiations after which his recent opponents – Uzbek leader Rashid Dostam and one of the the Hazaras leaders Mohammed Mohakkek threw their support behind the incumbent in return for posts in the future government. As a reward, Gen. Dostam regained the position of the Afghan army chief of staff and expected to get a number of posts for his associates. Five ministerial posts were promised to Mohakkek. Karzai’s team freely used the available administrative potential, the government-controlled media, and the cooperativeness of officials in provincial administrations during the presidential race. In his campaign, Karzai entrained tribal leaders, many of whom are war-crime suspects, and generously promised them various liens and benefits. Abdullah claims that the dishonest counting of the ballots was sanctioned by the government[1]. Roughly a third of the vote – some 1,500,000 ballots – were eventually regarded as requiring verification. Karzai got 1,100,000 of the amount. Still, Karzai is not the only candidate facing allegations of involvement in elections fraud. Some 300,000 dubious votes are attributed to Abdullah and 92,000 – to Bashardost[2]. The Election Complaints Commission has accumulated 2,800 complaints by mid-September[3].

It was announced initially that Karzai’s result reached 54.6% and no run-off was due. Abdullah, an ethnic Tajic with close ties to the Northern Alliance, got 28% and lost largely because he failed to drum up the support of the Pashtun population. The score of Gani, and ethnic Pashtun, was as low as 7% due to his renown Pashtun nationalism and overall pro-American orientation. The support for Bashardost – the candidate who garnered 10% of the vote – was limited to his Hazaras brethren. Eventually Abdullah protested the official elections result and called for a recount in all questioned cases.

The overall result was a stalemate. The assigning of over 50% of the vote to Karzai would have exposed the official electoral bodies to charges of fraud. A lower result for Karzai would have triggered allegations of foreign meddling. The West weighed various options such as a run-off regardless of the official count, the convention of Loya Jirga (the grand assembly of tribal representatives and clergy) to ease the tensions, and the forming of an interim administration or a national unity government.

The question brought to life as a result of the uncertainty of the elections outcome was of course: what’s next? Now the decision was to be made by the UN-supervised Independent Election Commission which had the authority to confirm the outcome of the elections upon reviewing complaints.

Given the difficult situation, Kabul started bracing for a run-off, which was a time-consuming and complicated process. The run-off currently scheduled for November 7 will be costly, and the Afghan climate will make a number of mountainous regions inaccessible for the election officials and watchdogs already in the early November. Finally, the question arising naturally is: is there a guarantee that the second round will be fairer than the first one? The population is tired of the uncertainty, endless recounts, and allegation exchanges between politicians.

The West had a hard time deciding whether to recognize Karzai’s victory, thus providing the Talibs with an opportunity to assert that he is a puppet of other countries, or to push for a run-off. Karzai’s opponents demanded a recount and the perpetuation of the whole process loomed on the horizon. Finally the Commission decided to verify the results at the polling stations where the voter turnout reached 100% or either of the candidates garnered over 95% of the vote.

The community of Western diplomats in Kabul was divided over the situation. UN Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan Peter Galbraith, a US diplomat, demanded a full recount while his chief Kai Eide adopted a much more moderate stance on the matter. As a result, Galbraith was ordered out of Afghanistan. The schism – the disagreement between those wishing to preserve the status quo and the hardliners seeking an investigation and a recount – affected the UN, the EU representatives, and finally, even the Electoral Complaints Commission. One of the members of the latter panel – Mustafa Barakzai – resigned upon charging its members representing the Western countries with unilateralism. The West took advantage of the complex situation to exert pressure on Karzai, but at the same time the incumbent was able to publicly blame the violations during the elections on foreign meddling. Needless to say, Karzai bluntly charged EU observers with attempting to tailor the outcome of the elections to their own tastes[4]. Karzai’s team said their assessments were unilateral and irresponsible, as well as collided with the Afghan constitution[5]. On the whole, Afghanistan got trapped in a political crisis.

The uncertainty presented the US and NATO with difficult questions concerning their future course and partners in Afghanistan. Karzai’s inaptness and incompetence have been fully exposed. He brought to the administration a number of odious figures, and currently it is unclear what the new structure of the administration will be and how the parliament will interact with the new government packed with tribal leaders, drug lords, and various other elements with criminal records. Generally, the removal of Galbraith may be an indication of the US drift towards unwillingly recognizing Karzai’s victory. US and NATO envoys told the Afghan foreign minister in September they hoped Karzai would remain in office for another term and they would jointly fight the Talibs[6].

Quite likely the US will have to shift its priorities in Afghanistan, and in the nearest future security and economic development will overshadow the theme of democracy formerly upheld by G. Bush. Discussions are underway in the White House concerning an overhaul of the US strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but no unity is achieved so far. Vice President J. Biden proposes reducing the number of US troops in Afghanistan and focusing on the task of eliminating the Al Qaeda network in Pakistan with the help of Predator drones. The same view is held by former US ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad. Their opponents – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff M. Mullen and top commander of American forces in Afghanistan Gen. S. McCrystal, on the contrary, want to additionally pour 40,000 troops into the country. Secretary of Defense R. Gates opines that the increase in Afghanistan prior to the complete withdrawal from Iraq would be overly burdensome for the US, plus the reaction of the Afghan population can be sharply negative as the situation would reek of downright occupation. R. Gates is reiterating that the mission of the US forces in Afghanistan requires further clarification.

So far, however, discussions are revolving around the military aspects of the new US Administration’s strategy, while the socioeconomic dimension of the Afghan problem remains ignored. No doubt, improving the security climate in Afghanistan, fighting extremism and terrorism are the key tasks to be addressed to help life in the country revert to normalcy. When the election crisis is over, the new Afghan government and the international community will have to once again look into the feasibility of a dialog with the Talibs. Such a dialog, however, should be opened only from the position of strength, which has not become possible so far.

While the Electoral Complaints Commission was brewing its verdict, US President B. Obama, who had previously announced that more troops would be dispatched to Afghanistan, changed his position abruptly following a series of consultations with his advisors. Now Washington says the decision on sending more troops to Afghanistan will not be made until there is legitimate administration in Kabul capable of efficiently interacting with the US. In the meantime, Washington is worrying whether their Afghan partner is ready to fill the niche created by the US troops and become a true aide helping to run the country[7]. Publicly assigning the Afghan president the aide role, the US is indicating for the fist time that it is seeking direct control in Afghanistan.

Searches for the way to break out of the stalemate were accompanied by intense US pressure on Karzai. He met US Secretary of State H. Clinton, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, British Prime Minister G. Brown, other western leaders, and Pakistani President A. Zardari. Their efforts were not wasted: on October 20 the Electoral Complaints Commission submitted a report admitting massive fraud and stating that neither of the candidates had garnered over 50% of the vote. The Central Electoral Commission said after a recount that Karzai had 49.6% and a run-off was necessary. Initially Karzai expressed extreme displeasure with the findings and charged the West with conspiring against him, but promptly capitulated and accepted the November 7 run-off.

It is possible that the run-off will render the situation even unclearer. In any case, the people of Afghanistan who are equally tired of Karzai, his US patrons, and the Talibs, will hardly benefit from the elections. The Afghans need peace and stability, which the second round of the “democratic show” is not going to deliver.

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1. Hal Bernton, Mcclatchy. At some Afghan polling places, Karzai got every vote. Mcclatchy Newspapers, Sep 5, 2009.
2. Afghan minister: Western countries want to change election result on their own. KABUL, (Xinhua), Sept. 17, 2009.
3. Hadi Mayar, Abdul Haleem. Rigging-weakened Karzai facing monstrous challenges if re-elected. KABUL (Xinhua) , Sept. 15, 2009.
4. Afghan minister: Western countries want to change election result on their own. KABUL (Xinhua), Sept. 17, 2009.
5. Ibid.
6. Karen DeYoung. U.S., Allies Vow Support for Karzai. Washington Post, September 28, 2009.
7. The White House on the situation in Afghanistan. Washington, October 19. ITAR-TASS. D. Kirsanov